Covenant Review Archives - ׶Ƶ Know More. Risk Better.® Tue, 28 Oct 2025 15:54:42 +0000 en-US hourly 1 /wp-content/uploads/cropped-favicon-512x512-1-32x32.png Covenant Review Archives - ׶Ƶ 32 32 Beyond the Print: Assessing Xerox’s Financial Flexibility & Strategic Levers /events-type/beyond-the-print-assessing-xeroxs-financial-flexibility-strategic-levers/ Tue, 28 Oct 2025 15:54:42 +0000 /?post_type=events-type&p=30189 The post Beyond the Print: Assessing Xerox’s Financial Flexibility & Strategic Levers appeared first on ׶Ƶ.

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Did You Know Covenant Review’s Scoring Just Got Smarter For Leveraged Finance? /did-you-know-covenant-review-scoring-is-smarter/ Fri, 26 Sep 2025 17:57:57 +0000 /?p=29217 The post Did You Know Covenant Review’s Scoring Just Got Smarter For Leveraged Finance? appeared first on ׶Ƶ.

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Understanding the complexities of covenants is tough, especially when every document is different. The nuances matter, and without a like-for-like comparison system it’s hard to tell where protections are strong or weak. To solve this problem, in 2019 Covenant Review introduced an innovative loan documentation scoring framework to break down complex leveraged finance documents. Since then, LMEs and other market developments have increased complexity and heightened the need for clear, consistent evaluation. That’s why we’ve upgraded our Documentation Scoring to a more transparent, unified framework that brings sharper comparability and actionable insight across deals and regions. This new framework builds on our original groundbreaking scoring system delivering enhanced clarity and actionable insights for leveraged finance professionals worldwide.

Behind these enhancements is a blend of robust empirical data and qualitative legal judgment from seasoned practitioners. Documentation Scoring captures covenant nuances from ratio calculations/basket flexibility and EBITDA adjustments to mandatory prepayments and flexibility provided by named loopholes and other provisions that facilitate LMEs, ensuring a comprehensive assessment of lender protection.

What’s changed from the original scoring?

Documentation Scoring 2.0 goes beyond the original framework by integrating new data points, refined weighting, and advanced scoring techniques. The main additions to the process includes:

  • Value Leakage Protection: A dedicated sub-score that quantifies the potential for value to move away from the credit. It assesses flexibility around transfers to unrestricted subsidiaries, investments and joint ventures, dividends and distributions, asset sales and leakage mechanisms, and related carve-outs and baskets.
  • Ratio Calculations and Basket Flexibility: A new Quality Factor that includes egregious exclusions of debt, high watermark features, and reclassification provisions, so that you can better ascertain calculation manipulations.
  • Reporting Protection (Now Available in the US): Already part of our European scoring, Reporting Protection scoring is now included for US documentation. It evaluates covenant features such as delivery frequency and timeliness of financials, audited statements, compliance certificates, KPI and add-back transparency, and other reporting safeguards.

What stays the same?

  • Our core pillars: Collateral Protection, Default Protection, Liquidity Protection (EU), and Lenders’ Repricing Optionality remain central to our review process.
  • Methodology: We continue to blend detailed empirical inputs with qualitative legal judgment from experienced practitioners, capturing nuances from structural subordination and EBITDA adjustments to mandatory prepayments and transfer provisions.
  • Consistent outputs: Sub-scores roll into a transparent, document-level score designed for like-for-like comparisons across regions and over time.

Why the change?

The upgraded scoring system provides atransparent, unified frameworkfor evaluating documentation risk across regions. You can now access a more consistent and actionable view of covenant strength, supporting better decision-making in a fast-evolving market.

The result for leveraged finance professionals:
  • More complete risk picture: Directly scoring value leakage and reporting discipline surfaces key drivers of recoveries, documentation discipline, and monitoring.
  • Better comparability: Extending Reporting Protection to US deals aligns regional coverage, simplifying cross-border screening and portfolio monitoring.
  • Actionable insight: The refined coverage supports quicker triage, tighter comps, and clearer escalation when negotiating terms.

Documentation Score 2.0 is available now within Covenant Review reports via ׶Ƶ.

Request a free trial today to get access to these insights.

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Covenants 101: Decoding Bond and Loan Covenants /events-type/covenants-101-decoding-bond-and-loan-covenants/ Fri, 28 Mar 2025 12:19:06 +0000 /?post_type=events-type&p=26329 The post Covenants 101: Decoding Bond and Loan Covenants appeared first on ׶Ƶ.

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Did you know Covenant Review can revolutionize your private credit strategy? /did-you-know-covenant-review-can-revolutionize-your-private-credit-strategy/ Tue, 14 Jan 2025 11:16:13 +0000 /?p=24016 The post Did you know Covenant Review can revolutionize your private credit strategy? appeared first on ׶Ƶ.

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In the ever-evolving world ofprivatecredit, staying ahead can feel like a marathon. But with Covenant Review’sPrivateCreditProduct, anyone—from asset managers and law firms to CLO managers and originators—can gain the insights and strategic foresight needed to navigate this complex landscape with confidence.

Understanding the Challenges Global private credit investments are booming, with the market size projected to grow from about $1.5 trillion at the start of 2024 to $2.8 trillion by 2028.In this dynamic environment, understanding and managing covenants are essential for mitigating risks and seizing opportunities. Investors are increasingly drawn toprivatecreditfor its potential to deliver higher returns, making it a crucial area to master.

Our Solution: Covenant Review’sPrivateCreditProduct

In-Depth Risk ManagementWe dive deep into covenant structures, offering detailed analyses that help you understand the protections and restrictions within loan documentation. This allows you to accurately assess risks and make informed investment decisions that align with your strategic goals.

Enhanced TransparencyDespite the market’s growth,privatecreditloans remain opaque due to their confidential nature. Our proprietary blend of Documentation Scores,PrivateCredit TrendLines Reports, and Custom Portfolio Analyses sheds light on over 200 distinct data points in creditagreements. This transparency lets you compare your transactions against broader market benchmarks.

Optimized Deal StructuresStay ahead of the curve with our research on trends and innovations inprivatecreditdeals, includingprivatecredit ETFs and major bank partnerships. For example, our analysis of the Pluralsight transaction highlighted potential risks, while assuaging alarm bells in the market about the impending threat of lender-on-lender violence in private credit.You can read more about this in our articlehere.This knowledge helps you optimize deal structures, negotiate better terms, and secure favorable covenants.

Market Entry and Expansion StrategiesWhether you’re looking to enter or expand in theprivatecreditmarket, our actionable insights on risk profiles and loan documentation can help you identify new opportunities and diversify your portfolio. Theprivatecreditmarket’s ability to provide liquidity during volatile periods, particularly since the onset of Covid-19, has been a significant advantage.

Investor Confidence and RelationsBuilding and maintaining investor confidence is crucial. Our detailed reports equip you with the knowledge to effectively communicate safeguards and risk mitigations, fostering stronger investor relationships and attracting more capital. The close relationship between lenders and borrowers inprivatecreditdeals often leads to higher returns and better recovery rates in case of defaults.

Be Proactive, Not ReactiveIn a competitive environment, being proactive rather than reactive gives investors a significant edge. With Covenant Review, you can stay ahead of market trends and changes, ensuring that you’re always in the best position to capitalize on emerging opportunities and mitigate risks.

Key Features:

  • Personal Attention of Highly Trained Legal Professionals:Eachcreditagreement or amendment is reviewed by one of our experienced loan analysts, who are available to answer any questions.
  • In-Depth Individual Deal Reports:Gain deep insights into more than 200 provisions specific to each transaction.
  • Proprietary Documentation Scores:Over 100 data points are scored on a 1-5 basis to provide a comprehensive overview of each transaction.
  • Trend Reports:Access our exclusive set of benchmarks, sourced from thousands ofcreditagreements and amendment reviews.
  • Custom Portfolio Analysis:Benchmark your portfolio against our extensive database.

In the fast-pacedprivatecreditmarket, strategic use of covenants is key to managing risks, ensuring compliance, and achieving superior returns. Covenant Review’s specialized research provides the insights needed to enhance your investment strategies and maintain a competitive edge.

Stay ahead in thePrivateCreditMarket with Covenant Review – your trusted partner in covenant intelligence and analysis.

Contact us to learn more.
Ian K. Walker, J.D. – Head of Legal Innovation at Covenant Review
Jessica Reiss, J.D. – Head of U.S. Loans Research at Covenant Review

 

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A New Paradigm: Liability Management and Bankruptcy Practice in a Post-Serta and Mitel World /events-type/a-new-paradigm-liability-management-and-bankruptcy-practice-in-a-post-serta-and-mitel-world/ Thu, 09 Jan 2025 22:34:05 +0000 /?post_type=events-type&p=24580 The post A New Paradigm: Liability Management and Bankruptcy Practice in a Post-Serta and Mitel World appeared first on ׶Ƶ.

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Hertz: Another Instance of Vote Rigging /hertz-another-instance-of-vote-rigging/ Fri, 13 Dec 2024 21:00:27 +0000 /?p=24102 The post Hertz: Another Instance of Vote Rigging appeared first on ׶Ƶ.

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Hertz: Another Instance of Vote Rigging:

  • Last week, Hertz was in the market with $500 million of add-on notes under its existing 1L indenture.
  • Concurrently, Hertz launched a solicitation of consents for amendments to the 1L indenture.
  • The Company is rigging the vote by having the new add-on notes be deemed to consent to the amendments.
  • We explain the proposed amendments, explain how the vote rigging works, and consider whether the proposed amendments may not actually be allowed under the Indenture.
  • Traditionally, bondholders have expected to be protected by indenture covenants unless those protections are amended or waived with consent from a majority of existing holders, but Hertz’ vote-rigging move raises the possibility that other issuers may follow suit, eroding these expectations.

Overview

Earlier this year, The Hertz Corporation (the “Company”) issued $750 million of 12.625% First Lien Senior Secured Notes due 2029 (the “Initial Notes”) under a June 28, 2024 Indenture (as supplemented by a July 19, 2024 First Supplemental Indenture, the “Indenture”). Last week, the Company marketed $500 million of add- on notes under the Indenture (the “Additional Notes” and, together with the Initial Notes, the “Notes”). The Additional Notes were marketed via a December 5, 2024 Preliminary Offering Memorandum (the “Preliminary OM”).

Concurrently with the Additional Notes offering, the Company commenced a consent solicitation with respect to certain proposed amendments to the Indenture (the “Proposed Amendments”). The most interesting feature of this consent solicitation is that the Company is rigging the vote by having the Additional Notes be deemed to consent. Due to this vote rigging, the Company has already locked in sufficient votes to ensure that the Proposed Amendments are approved. We explain the Proposed Amendments, explain how the vote rigging works, and consider whether the Proposed Amendments may not actually be allowed under the Indenture.

 


Disclosures

This report is the product of Covenant Review. Covenant Review is an affiliate of Fitch Group, which also owns Fitch Ratings. Covenant Review is solely responsible for the content of this report, which was produced independently from Fitch Ratings.
All content is copyright 2024 by Covenant Review, LLC. The recipient of this report may not redistribute or republish any of the information contained herein, in part or whole, without the express written permission of Covenant Review, LLC and we will criminally and civilly prosecute copyright violations against firms and individuals who unlawfully distribute our work. The use of this report is further limited as described in the subscription agreement between Covenant Review, LLC and the subscriber. The information contained in this report is intended to generally describe certain covenant features. This report is not comprehensive, is not confidential to any person or entity, and should not be treated as a substitute for professional advice in any specific situation. Covenant Review, LLC makes no warranty, express or implied, as to the fitness of the information in this report for any particular purpose. If you require legal or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a qualified attorney or investment professional. Covenant Review, LLC does not render, and nothing in this report constitutes, legal or investment advice, and recipients of this report will not be treated or considered by Covenant Review, LLC as clients or customers except as described in the subscription agreement between Covenant Review, LLC and the subscriber. Any covenants discussed herein may be based on those contained in the preliminary offering memorandum or draft credit agreement distributed by the issuer or borrower in connection with the issuance of the bonds or loans, and the covenants published in the final offering memorandum or contained in the final indenture or credit agreement may differ from those presented herein. The reader should be aware that the final interpretation of any bond indenture, credit agreement, security or guarantee agreement, or other bond or loan documents, will generally be determined by the issuer or its counsel, or in certain circumstances, by a court or administrative body.

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Is Pluralsight the Proverbial “Canary in the Mine” of Liability Management Exercises (“LMEs”) in Private Credit? /is-pluralsight-the-proverbial-canary-in-the-mine-of-liability-management-exercises-lmes-in-private-credit/ Wed, 30 Oct 2024 17:14:14 +0000 /?p=23281 The post Is Pluralsight the Proverbial “Canary in the Mine” of Liability Management Exercises (“LMEs”) in Private Credit? appeared first on ׶Ƶ.

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The Bottom Line:

  • According to reports in LevFin Insights and the financial press, Vista Equity Partners recently made a $50 million capital injection into “Pluralsight”, one of its portfolio companies.
  • The proceeds were reportedly used to fund an interest payment on Pluralsight’s ~$1.5b private credit term loan.
  • The capital injection was reportedly made by way of a loan from Vista to a newly formed non-guarantor subsidiary of Pluralsight, which then upstreamed an unspecified amount of the proceeds to Pluralsight.
  • This transaction set off alarm bells in the market that lender-on-lender violence is coming to private credit.
  • Our view is that the alarm bells are premature.

Overview

According to reports in LevFin Insights and the financial press, US-based Vista Equity Partners (“Vista”) recently made a $50 million capital injection into Pluralsight, Inc. (“Pluralsight”), one of its portfolio companies.12 The proceeds were reportedly used to fund an interest payment on Pluralsight’s ~$1.5b private credit term loan. Pluralsight was unable to make the interest payments due to escalating interest rates, which also saw Vista write off the entire value of their equity investment.3 The capital injection was reportedly made by way of a loan from Vista to a newly formed non-guarantor subsidiary of Pluralsight, which then upstreamed an unspecified amount of the proceeds to Pluralsight. This new loan was secured by intellectual property assets originally pledged to the term loan lenders. The company reportedly transferred the assets from one or more guarantors of the ~$1.5b term loan to the newly formed non-guarantor subsidiary.4 This transaction set off alarm bells in the market that lender-on-lender violence is coming to private credit. Our view is that the alarm bells are premature—for now. The defining characteristic of LMEs in the modern era is lender-on-lender violence. Based on available reports, this was not the case here. More broadly, we think that while we cannot rule out the possibility of classic lender-on-lender violence style LMEs in private credit, we think plain vanilla restructurings will remain par for the course.

PluralSight – What Happened?

There are a number of key differences between what was purported to have occurred in Pluralsight versus a typical LME involving lender-on-lender violence.

  • “Plain sight” Covenant Capacity
    • We suspect the company utilized “plain sight” covenant capacity to (i) transfer IP to a newly formed non-guarantor restricted subsidiary, (ii) incur debt at such restricted subsidiary and (iii) dividend a portion (or all) of such proceeds to the borrower to satisfy the upcoming interest payment.
    • This kind of flexibility is contained in nearly all credit agreements, subject to agreed caps.
    • In contrast, the typical drop-down transaction is done at unrestricted subsidiaries. This is more problematic than dropdowns done at non-guarantor restricted subsidiaries because covenant capacity is not needed for any secured debt at unrestricted subsidiaries or for dividends paid by unrestricted subsidiaries.
  • Sponsor Priming Debt
    • Rather than a lender or group of lenders priming other lenders, the priming debt in this case was reportedly provided by the sponsor. Sponsor capital injections are typically done by way of additional equity. Not the case here. The Vista loan to Pluralsight’s non-guarantor subsidiary primed the secured lender group with a structurally senior claim with respect to the transferred IP and associated debt at such restricted subsidiary. And while such restricted subsidiary is subject to covenant restrictions, it is not a guarantor, nor are the transferred assets deemed collateral supporting the obligations following such permitted transfer.5

• Differences from J. Crew

    • Pluralsight effectively only utilized “step one” of the two-step J. Crew trap door, moving collateral from guarantors to non-guarantor restricted subsidiaries utilizing capped investments basket capacity. Thus, the newly formed restricted subsidiary holding the transferred IP remains subject to the credit agreement covenants and basket capacity to incur secured debt and pay dividends. In J. Crew, the collateral was moved outside of the restricted group in a subsequent second step, utilizing a hidden trap door permitting intercompany investments outside of the restricted group to unrestricted subsidiaries (so long as the initial investment was permitted). No such trap door was available here.

 

BSL vs Direct Lending – Key Differences and Impact on LMEs with Lender-on Lender Violence

There are key differences in the tone and tenor of broadly syndicated loans (“BSLs”) and direct lending or private loans which impact the dynamics of LME transactions.6 Private credit and direct lending generally have the following features which are not readily found in BSL transactions:

  • Smaller lender groups
    • Among others, negotiations amongst direct lenders are not as fractured as those between the BSL buy-side and sell-side.
  • Relationships—amongst lenders and between lenders and sponsors
    • Private credit lenders are long-term players; they are not looking for one-off opportunities.
    • Many of the private credit lenders are repeat “club” deal lenders, where sponsors will reach out to contacts at existing relationship lenders to club together a proposed deal. This often results in repeat players, with the same sponsor and lender group working together on different deals. Given this dynamic, both sponsors and private credit lenders tend to consider the overall lending relationship (existing and anticipated) more carefully, in addition to the transaction economics, when determining their course of action in any individual restructuring.
  • Limited liquidity of private credit loans and lack of transparency
    • This means there is limited activity from distressed players willing to provide opportunistic new money financing that primes existing debt.
    • Also, there is limited opportunistic trading into a name at distressed levels with expectations of an oversized return even if the ultimate recovery is only at par or less.
  • Lender protections
    • Certain lender favorable provisions prevalent in direct lending deals, including cross-over voting (requirements for two or more unaffiliated lenders to constitute a majority) and the increased prevalence of Serta provisions, make it more difficult to prime the minority in smaller lender groups.
  • Unity of Identity
    • Even with a cov-lite structure, there is unity of identity of revolver lenders and term lenders, so all lenders get an early warning signal and have leverage to negotiate.

Each of these dynamics leads direct lending to, in the current state of the market, be less susceptible to outright evasive LME transactions and lender-on-lender violence.

However, continuing growth of the private credit market with respect to the number of players, individual deal size, and the size of the market overall could change the dynamics identified above. Increased liquidity could lead to increased distressed and opportunistic trading.7 More lenders in individual deals could create inter-lender frictions and reduce the effectiveness of cross-over voting and other lender protections. More players in the market may lessen the importance of relationships.

Takeaways and Considerations

  • While Pluralsight is not a typical LME with lender-on-lender violence, it is a more vanilla restructuring which reportedly resulted in sponsor priming debt. No latent strategy was used. Instead, non-guarantor restricted subsidiary basket capacity was utilized to transfer IP, incur priming debt held by the sponsor and to distribute the proceeds to the borrower. This can be considered a version of an uptiering transaction, albeit without lender-on-lender violence.
  • Lenders and their advisors should make sure they are paying close attention to covenants for non-guarantor restricted subsidiaries, including their ability to incur secured debt and to make investments and pay dividends. Lenders should pay attention to not just basket sizing, but the related guardrails and how such baskets are able to be utilized (e.g., whether non-guarantor restricted subsidiaries can pay dividends to the financial sponsor as opposed to just guarantors).
  • Pluralsight is separate and distinct from drop-down transactions involving unrestricted subsidiary asset transfers, as characterized by the J. Crew transaction.
  • There are key differences in broadly syndicated loans vs. direct lending loans which should place additional guardrails around the potential for LMEs with lender-on-lender violence in private credit, versus the higher frequency occurrence of these in the broadly syndicated loan market.

— Covenant Review

 


Disclosures

This report is the product of Covenant Review. Covenant Review is an affiliate of Fitch Group, which also owns Fitch Ratings. Covenant Review is solely responsible for the content of this report, which was produced independently from Fitch Ratings.
All content is copyright 2024 by Covenant Review, LLC. The recipient of this report may not redistribute or republish any of the information contained herein, in part or whole, without the express written permission of Covenant Review, LLC and we will criminally and civilly prosecute copyright violations against firms and individuals who unlawfully distribute our work. The use of this report is further limited as described in the subscription agreement between Covenant Review, LLC and the subscriber. The information contained in this report is intended to generally describe certain covenant features. This report is not comprehensive, is not confidential to any person or entity, and should not be treated as a substitute for professional advice in any specific situation. Covenant Review, LLC makes no warranty, express or implied, as to the fitness of the information in this report for any particular purpose. If you require legal or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a qualified attorney or investment professional. Covenant Review, LLC does not render, and nothing in this report constitutes, legal or investment advice, and recipients of this report will not be treated or considered by Covenant Review, LLC as clients or customers except as described in the subscription agreement between Covenant Review, LLC and the subscriber. Any covenants discussed herein may be based on those contained in the preliminary offering memorandum or draft credit agreement distributed by the issuer or borrower in connection with the issuance of the bonds or loans, and the covenants published in the final offering memorandum or contained in the final indenture or credit agreement may differ from those presented herein. The reader should be aware that the final interpretation of any bond indenture, credit agreement, security or guarantee agreement, or other bond or loan documents, will generally be determined by the issuer or its counsel, or in certain circumstances, by a court or administrative body.

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Liability Management Transactions: Quarterly Update Through Q1 2024 /liability-management-transactions-quarterly-update-through-q1-2024/ Fri, 19 Apr 2024 18:57:02 +0000 /?p=19691 The Bottom Line: Borrowers and issuers have been engaging in “Liability Management Transactions” with increasing frequency since the onset of the pandemic in 2020. This includes both more established types...

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The Bottom Line:

  • Borrowers and issuers have been engaging in “Liability Management Transactions” with increasing frequency since the onset of the pandemic in 2020.
  • This includes both more established types of transactions, as well as more novel structures such as the “double徱” and structures that combine several different common LMT elements.
  • In this report, we provide a brief description of the various flavors of Liability Management Transactions that we have seen, and we also include graphical representations of the most common structures.
  • We also summarize each of the Liability Management Transactions that have been tracked by Covenant Review and LFI since 2014, through the end of the first quarter of 2024.
  • We also provide data regarding postbankruptcy recovery rates and how they were impacted by LMTs for issuers that emerged from bankruptcy protection during the 2023 calendar year.

Overview

As has been widely discussed by various market pratictioners and commentators, the frequency of loan and bond issuers engaging in socalled Liability Management Transactions (“LMTs”) has increased dramatically over the past several years. This report is a compendium of all Liability Management Transactions tracked by Covenant Review and sister company LevFin Insights since 2014, including both public and private transactions. We intend to update this report on a quarterly basis. In this report, we provide additional details for LMTs that were either launched or completed in Q1 of 2024, as well as some updates to previously announced LMTs. We also share analysis performed by the Leveraged Finance team at Fitch Ratings on postLMT recovery rates for issuers that have conducted one or more LMTs and subsequently filed for and emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.

Types of LMTs

Covenant Review categorizes LMTs into four major groups: DoubleDips, DropDowns, Uptiers, and “Miscellanous.” In the last category, we include socalled “Chewy Releases” as well as other transactions that involve the combination of multiple other types of LMTs. We provide a brief description of the features of each of these transactions, though we note that each transaction is driven by the specific capital structure and covenant requirements. Accordingly, there are variations within each of the foregoing prototype LMTs. Both the fourth quarter of 2023 and the first quarter of 2024 witnessed several transactions that incorporated multiple LMT structures, which we describe in the transaction tracking chart below.

That said, there are common themes and document flexibilities that are utilized in these LMTs. Generally speaking, LMTs involve a balance sheet restructuring (conducted outside, of course, of the bankruptcy courts). This can be achieved in many ways, including through priming debt incurrences, equal priority claims on collateral assets, collateral stripping through investments or asset sales, and coercive covenantstripping amendments, among other techniques.

Double-Dip and Pari-Plus LMTs

Double-Dips

DoubleDips, still the newest flavor of LMTs, involve the potential enhancement of claims against existing collateral assets. This usually occurs via the following structure: (1) incurrence of a new debt facility at a nonguarantor subsidiary of the existing borrower / issuer, either within or outside of the restricted group; and (2) onlending the proceeds of the new debt facility to the existing borrower / issuer via an intercompany loan facility, with the new nonguarantor subsidiary borrower as the lender. The facility incurred under step one is usually guaranteed and secured by the existing guarantors and collateral assets that provide credit support for the existing debt obligations. On top of that, the intercompany loan facility is also guaranteed and secured by the same guarantors and collateral. In this way, the secured claims include both of the facilities incurred under clauses (1) and (2), as the intercompany loan facility provides the thirdparty lenders with an indirect claim against the guarantors / collateral assets. This is because the intercompany loan itself is an asset of the new nonguarantor subsidiary borrower, which is often also pledged for the benefit of the thirdparty lenders. In other words, for each $100 of new money, the new lenders now have $200 of claimshence a “double dip.”

Pari-Plus

Another style of DoubleDip is the “PariPlus” transaction structure, which was utilized in the Sabre LMTs from 2023. This involves the provision of additional credit support to one group of lenders by using an intercompany loan structure borrowed from DoubleDips. In the Sabre transaction, this included the (1) incurrence of a new money term loan facility by an unrestricted subsidiary, (2) guarantees by restricted foreign subsidiaries of the unrestricted subsidiary obligations under the new term loan, and (3) subsequent onlending of the new term loan proceeds to the existing guarantor group via a secured intercompany loan. As with the “regular” DoubleDip LMT structure, the intercompany loan incurred in this last step is usually pledged for the benefit of the new money lenders (ranking equal to the existing credit agreement obligations).

Double-Dip and Pari-Plus transactions are usually facilitated by the following covenant provisions:

  • Debt and Liens Covenant capacity:
    • The related credit agreements and/or indentures must have sufficient debt and liens capacity to allow both the debt incurrence by the applicable nonguarantor subsidiary (i.e., the “New Money Loan”), and the subsequent intercompany loan facility incurrence of the onlent proceeds of the New Money Loan. Depending on the use of proceeds of the New Money Loan, this could potentially qualify as “refinancing debt” in respect of existing pari passu secured obligations (as was the case in Sabre and some of the other transactions we have covered).
    • The debt agreements also must provide sufficient capacity for the guarantees (and collateral support, if any) provided by the existing credit parties in respect of the New Money Loan obligations incurred by the nonguarantor subsidiary.
  • Investments Covenant capacity:
    • As the provision of a guarantee is also normally an “Investment,” capacity under the Investments Covenant is usually required as well. Often, however, the Investments Covenant includes a generic crossreference permitting any debt that is permitted to be incurred by the Debt covenant under the Investments Covenant as well. As such, if the Debt covenant provides sufficient capacity, often this will be sufficient to justify the Investment portion of the DoubleDip.
  • Other potential relevant provisions:
    • There also must not be any requirement that intercompany loans and guarantees be subordinated to other obligations; this is a common limitation but often only applies to intercompany loans using the dedicated intercompany debt basket (rather than a “global” requirement that overrides all existing debt and liens baskets).
    • To the extent an unrestricted subsidiary is the borrower under the new facility, there must also be no limitation on credit support provided by the restricted group in respect of unrestricted subsidiary debt obligations.

Although the ultimate enforceability in bankruptcy of the two claims for the full amount for Double Dip transactions is still an open question, it is certainly clear that borrowers and issuers utilized this structure with increasing frequency throughout 2023 and this trend has continued into 2024, though several of the more recent transactions have included a DoubleDip LMT combined with an Uptier LMT or a DropDown LMT.

See Annex I below for a visual representation of a prototypical DoubleDip LMT, and Annex II below for the portrayal of a PariPlus LMT.

Drop-Down LMTs

Drop-Down LMTs generally take one of two flavors: those utilizing unrestricted subsidiaries, and those utilizing non-guarantor restricted subsidiaries.

 

  • DropDowns utilizing unrestricted subsidiaries: These transactions typically involve the transfer of one or more assets of the relevant borrower to an Unrestricted Subsidiary, which is itself not subject to the covenants. That Unrestricted Subsidiary, in turn, can either incur debt that is structurally senior in respect of the transferred asset(s), or alternatively sell the asset(s), which then results in the net cash proceeds of any such asset sale not being subject to the credit agreement asset sale sweep.
  • DropDowns utilizing restricted nonguarantor subsidiaries: These transactions, which are somewhat less common, typically involve the transfer of one or more assets within the restricted group from a guarantor to a nonguarantor Restricted Subsidiary, as permitted by the Investments covenant. That entity, in turn, can incur debt to the extent permitted by the Debt covenant, and that new debt (even if unsecured) will also be structurally senior to the claims of the existing credit agreement lenders.

Drop-Down LMTs can (and increasingly have been) combined with Uptier LMTs in a manner described below. See Annex III below for a visual representation of a Drop-Down LMT.

Uptier LMTs

Uptier LMTs typically involve amending an existing credit agreement with the consent of a majority lender group to permit the incurrence of a senior priority debt tranche and the nonpro rata exchange of some or all of the existing consenting lender credit agreement debt into the new priority tranche. This may or may not be accompanied by a “new money” debt commitment, or may simply involve the exchange of preexisting debt. Although some uncertainty was created due to court rulings in the Serta and Boardriders litigations, it was clear that borrowers continued to utilize Uptier LMTs after Judge Jones’s ruling in the Serta Simmons Chapter 11 litigation that dismissed most of the relevant minority lender claims.

However, the recent decision by Judge Isgur Wesco / Incora litigation may cast some doubt on the continued efficacy of these transactions, or at least for those with a vote rigging element (i.e., where an amendment is structured to allow for the incurrence of additional incremental debt in order to meet a specific consent threshold). On January 14, 2024, Judge Isgur of the Southern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court issued several lenderfavorable rulings, including that certain of relevant voting provisions under the related indentures were ambiguous as a matter of law and denying ڱԻԳٲ’ motion for summary judgment on tortious interference claims.1 This somewhat surpising lender win was due at least in part to a determination that Incora’s twostep transaction was (arguably) part and parcel of the same single series of transactions, under the “step transaction” or “integrated transaction” doctrine. Similar arguments are currently being made by certain of the lenders involved in Robertshaw’s various litigations, as part of the claims also involve a vote rigging element. Although a full review of this decision is outside of the scope of this article, we note that this decision stands in direct contrast to Judge Jones’s Serta ruling, and as such may provide excluded lenders with some hopes of future challenges to Uptier LMTs.

See Annex IV below for a graphical representation of a paradigmatic (Serta) Uptier LMT.

Chewy LMTs

The Chewy transaction involved (in part) the release of a restricted subsidiary guarantor from its obligations under the existing PetSmart credit agreement due to the transfer of a portion of equity of Chewy to an unrestricted subsidiary, as well as the spinoff of another portion of Chewy equity to the equity sponsor. Because nonwholly owned subsidiaries are typically excluded from the guarantee requirements under broadly syndicated credit agreements, this could result in valuable subsidiaries being released from their guarantee and collateral support of existing obligations through the transfer of a small portion of equity outside of the restricted group (Chewy itself, however, remained a restricted, but nonwholly owned and nonguarantor, subsidiary). In response, the market has witnessed an uptick in “Chewy blocker” provisions, which seek to address this flaw in a myriad of ways.

Chewy LMTs remain a relatively rare occurrence even in this day and age of creative LMTs, in part because the released guarantor usually remains a restricted subsidiary (that is still subject to the limitations and restrictions of the covenants). Indeed, Chewy LMTs function very similarly to DropDowns, but DropDowns (at least those involving unrestricted subsidiaries) almost always provide significantly greater flexibility for the borrower in question.

“Combined” LMTs, Envision LMTs (and other miscellaneous LMTs)

Recently, several LMTs have included multiple of the abovementioned elements. This occurred in the Envision transaction, where the sponsor (KKR) combined elements of both DropDown and Uptier LMTs by both designating valuable assets (of a specified subsidiary) as an unrestricted subsidiary, followed by an uptier exchange offer transaction. We explain the details in our Envision Blocker report, but this transaction illustrates the “creativity” of sponsors in the LMT space.

There also are a smattering of additional LMT transactions, which include assetbased revolverrelated amendments, debt incurrences in reliance on securitization baskets, payment default grace periodrelated amendments, collateral releases, and other kinds of coercive exchanges.

Post-LMT Recovery Rates

Our colleagues at Fitch Ratings have undertaken an analysis of recovery rates following a Chapter 11 restructuring process for issuers that have conducted one or more LMTs prior to filing for bankruptcy protection. Their data, which is based on postemergence expected recoveries pursuant to the approved restructuring plan in the related bankruptcy, illustrates that there is a divergence in overall and relative recoveries for first lien lenders between issuers that have and have not conducted LMTs prior to a bankruptcy filing.

  • For issuers emerging in 2023, issuers who have executed LMTs prior to bankruptcy experienced weighted average aggregate recoveries of 47% on their original firstlien claims in 2023. This compares to a 57% average for issuers who have not excecuted LMTs prior to filing.
  • For issuers emerging in 2023 that executed one or more LMTs prior to a filing, there was also a material divergence in recovery rates for “in group” versus “out group” lenders. The most notable examples of these were the following:
    • Envision / AmSurg: In the Envision / AmSurg restructuring, the participating lenders (which exchanged loans into first and second lien loans at AmSurg) saw an approximately 85% blended recovery rate on their claims against the AmSurg subsidiary and roughly 30% on claims against the “remainco” Envision entities. The nonparticipating lenders, who were left in a “fourth out” or worse position relative to the other lenders at remainco, recovered essentially nothing.
    • Serta Simmons: In the Serta Simmons restructuring, which was the paradigmatic uptier transaction, the participating prepetition first lien lenders recovered 100% on their new money firstout claims and roughly 74.7% on their uptier exchange secondout claims, for a blended recovery rate of around 79.5%. This contrasts with an approximate 1.5% recovery for nonparticipating “thirdout” prepetition first lien lenders.
    • TPC Group: In the TPC Group restructuring, the “priming” first lien noteholders were rolled up into the DIP facility and eventually recovered 100%, while the nonparticipating first lien noteholder group recovered an estimated 44.1%.
    • Revlon: In the Revlon restructuring, the participating 2020 “Brandco” facility lenders recovered 100% on their firstout new money claims under the 2020 Brandco facility, and approximately 52.5% on their secondout claims reflecting the exchange of term loans under the company’s existing 2016 term loan facility. The nonparticipating lenders who continued to hold existing 2016 term loans were estimated to recover only 20%.
    • Diebold: In the Diebold restructuring, the superpriority term loan tranche obligations were rolled up into a DIP facility and eventually recovered 100%, while the nonparticipating first lien lenders were estimated to recover approcimately 38%.
    • Cineworld: In the Cineworld restructuring, the prepetition priming term loan facilities were rolled up into the DIP facility, and eventually recovered 100%. The nonparticipating legacy term loan facilities, however, recovered only an estimated 3.4%.

LMT Transaction Charts

In the following charts, we outline each of the LMTs that have been covered since we began tracking these types of transactions in 2014, together with the sponsor (if any) that drove the transaction, a brief description of what happened in the transaction, and the ultimate transaction outcome (if known). As we can see from the details below, often a LMT still leads to a bankruptcy filing.

LMTs with Primarily Douple-Dip Elements

Serta-style Uptier LMTs

Drop-Down LMTs

Multiple Element LMTs, Chewy / PetSmart LMTs, and Other Miscellaneous LMTs

Conclusion

As interest costs continue to remain comparatively high relative to prior years and default rates have ticked up over time, we expect that more companies will seek to opportunistically refinance near-term debt maturities in various creative and novel ways. We will continue to monitor the debt markets for potential future liability management transactions and any related judicial decisions in due course.

 


 

Annex I

Double-Dip Representative Structure (At Home)

 

Annex II

Pari-Plus LMT Representative Structure (Sabre)

 

Annex III

Drop-Down LMT Representative Structure

 

Annex IV

Uptier LMT Representative Structure (Serta)

Justin Forlenza, J.D.
Senior Covenant Analyst
Covenant Review

 


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Altice France: Hung out to Drahi – Part 1: News, Fundamentals, Covenants (Public Bonds) /events-type/altice-france-hung-out-to-drahi-part-1/ Fri, 05 Apr 2024 08:37:53 +0000 /?post_type=events-type&p=19562 The post Altice France: Hung out to Drahi – Part 1: News, Fundamentals, Covenants (Public Bonds) appeared first on ׶Ƶ.

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Market Alert: Beware the One Page Investment Bank Summary of Flex Terms /beware-the-one-page-investment-bank-summary-of-flex-terms/ Fri, 01 Mar 2024 20:05:24 +0000 /?p=18391 Overview In large cap syndicated leveraged loans, there are often changes made to the credit agreement after the initial draft is posted for lender review purportedly based on lender feedback....

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Overview

In large cap syndicated leveraged loans, there are often changes made to the credit agreement after the initial draft is posted for lender review purportedly based on lender feedback. These changes are referred to as “flex” and such changes are nominally intended to be lender friendly. 1 It is customary for the lead arrangers to circulate onepage transaction updates (a “One Pager”) to the lenders that are participating in the syndication describing the changes that have been agreed to between the borrower and the lending syndicate (usually prior to, or even in lieu of, updated loan documentation). However, many times the brief descriptions of the revisions to the credit agreement included in the One Pager are incomplete or misleading. In this Report, we provide some examples of credit agreement terms that are commonly included in the One Pager but that often end up looking quite different in the final credit agreement.

Serta Protection

A very common flex term during syndication is the inclusion of what is colloquially referred to as “Serta” protection (named after the company that utilized the particular weaknesses in loan documentation that are supposed to be addressed in the One Pager). For additional information on these provisions see our prior report here. Frequently the One Pager will include a short statement such as “Serta protection to be included” or words of similar effect. Lenders are led to believe that they have successfully negotiated an affected lender consent for amendments to subordinate the payment and lien priority of the obligations under the credit agreement.

However, lenders are frequently surprised when they read Covenant Review’s analysis of the language that was included in the revised credit agreement. There are often a number of exceptions or limitations on the protections that lenders did not agree to in the negotiations. For example, the Serta protection added will often include an exception for priming debt if the existing lenders are given a bona fide opportunity to participate in such debt on a pro rata basis. This appears on its face to be acceptable to lenders because this exception would at the very least prevent the exact facts of Serta, where the lenders that were outside the restructuring group woke up one morning to discover that they now held deeply subordinated obligations. However, there is often an exception to the pro rata offer requirement for certain fees, such as structuring fees. This allows the company to cut a deal with the majority lenders, compensate them with structuring fees, and then conduct a coercive exchange offer with the remaining lenders, who will not receive the structuring fees. 2 Another common exception to Serta protection is for priming debt permitted by the credit agreement. The flaw here is that it often isn’t limited to the credit agreement as in effect on the closing date. This potentially allows the company to amend the negative covenants to permit additional priming debt with just a majority lender vote to circumvent the Serta protection. In some very aggressive deals, there may even be a blanket exception for any priming revolver or asset-based facility. This exception swallows the rule, and it almost never includes restrictions on revolvers that term out over time, so the company could potentially incur a priming revolver and in very short order convert it into a priming term loan.

J. Crew Blockers

Another common flex term during syndication is addition of a J. Crew blocker (which are provisions meant to block the transfer of certain material assets—usually limited to IP—to unrestricted subsidiaries). As with Serta protection, it will often be a simple statement in the One Pager such as “J. Crew blocker to be included.” Lenders believe that they have successfully negotiated to keep at least material intellectual property (if not all material assets) from being transferred to unrestricted subsidiaries.

The scope of coverage of J. Crew blockers can vary greatly. For some examples of common methods that companies use to weaken J. Crew blockers, see our prior report here and for some of the inherent weaknesses of J. Crew blockers, see our prior report here. All of the methods described in those reports have shown up in various forms in revised credit agreements after flex during syndication. And there are even more aggressive examples floating in the market. In one recent transaction, the J. Crew blocker was limited to three specific trademarks. The credit agreement did not even include a representation that these trademarks represented all material intellectual property, and, to the extent any intellectual property subsequently became material, it would not be covered.

A particularly egregious example of flawed blocker language came in another recent transaction. The One Pager that was circulated included “Incorporation of J. Crew & Chewy protections.” However, the language that was included in the credit agreement with respect to the J. Crew blocker had two significant limitations. The first was that transfers of material intellectual property to unrestricted subsidiaries were permitted as long as they didn’t cause a “Material Adverse Effect.” Given how broadly the term “Material Adverse Effect” is defined in most BSL credit agreements, it would take an absolutely catastrophic event to be triggered, rendering the J. Crew blocker essentially meaningless. To add insult to injury, transfers of material intellectual property to unrestricted subsidiaries would be permitted if the loan parties continued to “have use of such Material Intellectual Property.” So, a transfer of material intellectual property to an unrestricted subsidiary with a relicense back to the loan parties would be permitted. The reason that is so galling is that it is exactly what was done in the J. Crew transaction itself. The One Pager said that J. Crew protection would be incorporated, but the provision that showed up in the revised credit agreement would not have protected from J. Crew! That’s the level of craziness we have reached in the broadly syndicated leveraged loan market.

Chewy Blockers

Lenders often also seek socalled “Chewy” or “PetSmart” blockers during syndication. One Pagers are again often quite vague on this kind of protection, with a statement such as “Chewy blocker to be added.” For background on the genesis of Chewy blockers, see our prior report here. Lenders may think that transfers of minority equity stakes of guarantors to affiliates (which causes release of the guarantee and liens of such subsidiary) are going to be prohibited.

There are a number of ways in which Chewy blockers are watered down. A common example is allowing transfers to affiliates if there is a bona fide business purpose. This allows the company to come up with some reason why it makes business sense to transfer equity of a guarantor to an affiliate and dare the lenders to sue over release of the guarantee. Another method is to permit release unless the primary purpose of the transfer was to cause the release of the guarantor. Under this formulation, even if lenders can prove that the release was one of the reasons why the equity was transferred to an affiliate, as long as there was some other benefit that outweighed the release, the transaction will be permitted.

An egregious example of a weakened Chewy blocker was also seen in the same recent transaction discussed under J. Crew blockers above. To repeat, the One Pager provided for “Incorporation of J. Crew & Chewy protections.” However, the language in the revised credit agreement only required a certification that the company would have been able to make an investment in the amount of the fair market value of the equity of the non-wholly owned subsidiary held by the restricted group on a pro forma basis. It didn’t appear to require utilization of investments capacity, and the credit agreement had the “free flow of value” problem where there is unlimited investments capacity in restricted subsidiaries. The Chewy blocker (if you can call it that) didn’t specify an investment in whom, so because the company had uncapped ability to make investments in restricted subsidiaries, it would always have capacity to make an investment in the amount of the fair market value of the equity of the non-wholly owned subsidiary in another restricted subsidiary. The Chewy blocker was effectively worthless.

Another example of a flawed Chewy blocker from a recent transaction appeared at a quick glance to be a normal (albeit aggressive) Chewy blocker, as it prohibited release of any guarantor that became non-wholly owned as a result of a transfer of equity interests to an affiliate in “a non-bona fide transaction the primary purpose…of which was to cause such entity to become an Excluded Subsidiary.” However, the provision allowed for release with the consent of the administrative agent. So, the administrative agent had the ability to release the guarantor if the transaction violated the Chewy blocker, significantly limiting its usefulness.

Other Examples

Of course, the foregoing are not the only instances where arrangers may “bury the lede.” Other examples include changes to ratio levels during flex. A One Pager may state that the ratio test for unlimited restricted payments will be set 1x inside “the Closing Date Net Total Leverage Ratio.” Lenders assume that this means that one turn of de-levering will be required from marketed levels before the ratio basket for restricted payments becomes available for utilization. The trick is that there the final credit agreement may end up using a defined term for “Closing Date Net Total Leverage Ratio” that sets the level somewhere outside (that is higher than) the marketed level. So instead of requiring one turn of de-levering, the company instead only needs to de-lever by 0.7x to access the carveout.

Lender calls can be another trick. The One Pager will say something like “Quarterly lender calls to be added.” Then the revised credit agreement shows up and the lender call is only required if the majority lenders, or—often—just the agent, request one, putting the onus on the lender group to demand the call. In effect, lender calls are not mandatory.

Conclusion

Lenders should be wary of the terms set forth in One Pagers. The interest of the lead arrangers is getting the deal fully syndicated on the best terms possible for the company—not to provide lenders with the best terms to protect themselves against liability management. An incomplete summary of the flex terms can help them achieve that as the lenders think they have negotiated for a set of revisions. In reality, however, the One Pager hides the truth: that the company has subsequently undermined many of the “negotiated” protections in order to make the deal better for itself.

Covenant Review will continue to assess the terms in One Pagers as we see them.

1 Terms that are changed in the borrower’s favor (most commonly in the context of pricing) are referred to as a “reverse flex.”

2 Indeed, Covenant Review has seen several recent uptiering liability management exercises where nonconsenting lenders found themselves between a rock and a hard place (either accept the priming debt terms, regardless of whether they would otherwise haveor face subordination, covenant / collateral strips, or worse).

 

Kevin Grondahl
Covenant Review


Disclosures

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