Private Credit Archives - ׶Ƶ Know More. Risk Better.® Fri, 27 Feb 2026 17:24:04 +0000 en-US hourly 1 /wp-content/uploads/cropped-favicon-512x512-1-32x32.png Private Credit Archives - ׶Ƶ 32 32 Private Credit Under the Microscope: Separating Headlines from Structural Reality /private-credit-under-the-microscope-separating-headlines-from-structural-reality/ Thu, 26 Feb 2026 17:53:52 +0000 /?p=33694 Investor sentiment toward private credit has softened in recent months after a prolonged period ofstrong growthand capital inflows. A combination of macro uncertainty, sector-specific concerns, and negative headlines has prompted...

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Investor sentiment toward private credit has softened in recent months after a prolonged period ofstrong growthand capital inflows. A combination of macro uncertainty, sector-specific concerns, and negative headlines has prompted lenders and investors to take a more cautious stance.

Several factors are contributing to this shift, including:

  • Potential disruptions to software borrowers and other sectors with meaningful AI exposure
  • Negative press surrounding Blue Owl and broader questions about liquidity dynamics in private credit vehicles
  • Concerns that rapid fundraising over recent years may have weakened underwriting discipline in parts of the market
  • Broader worries that a slowing economic backdrop could push default rates higher

Periods like this are not unusual in credit cycles. Market confidence can change quickly, particularly when headline events create uncertainty aroundrelatively opaqueasset classes. We saw a similar dynamic last summer following the “gradually-then-suddenly” bankruptcy filings of Tricolor and First Brands, which temporarily rattled investor confidence across segments of the private credit ecosystem.In fact, in the four-decade history of the modern leveraged finance market there have been three significant default spikes: early 1990s when the original junk bond frenzy fizzled in the aftermath of the 1991 recession, the early 2000s when the combination of the dot-com bubble bursting and the terror attacks of September plunged the economy into recession and the Great Financial Crisis of 2008/2009. But, to paraphrase Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip, the market has called no fewer than seven more default spikes that failed to materialize since 1990 including (1) irrational exuberance of 1996, (2) Russian debt default/LongTerm Capital implosion of 1998, (3) Government shutdown/US Credit Rating downgrade of 2011, (4) retail-pocalyseof 2014, (5) oil price crash of 2015, (6) rate tightening cycle of 2018, (7) Covid-19cessationof 2020, and (8) Ukraine war/inflation spike of 2022-2023.

How the current environment evolves will depend on a range of macro factors — including economic growth, interest rates, and broader credit market conditions — thatare impossibleto predict. In response, many private credit managers are actively re-underwriting portfolios, particularly in sectors such as software where technological disruption is a growing consideration. An important part of that process involves placingdocumentationstrength and covenant protections under closer scrutiny. One area where this question becomes particularly relevant is covenant quality.

Private Credit vs. Syndicated Markets: Structural Differences Still Matter

On average, private credit documentationremainsmore protective than broadly syndicated loan (BSL) markets. Direct lenders typically negotiate within smaller lender groups, allowing for tighter controls and more customized protections.

Two structural areas highlight this distinction:

Baskets
Private credit software baskets are, on average, materially tighter than thoseobservedin the syndicated market. For example, the average debt issuance limit for private credit software borrowers stands at approximately 1.6x pro forma EBITDA —roughly halfthe 3.2x levels commonly seen in syndicated transactions.

Loopholes
Structural loopholes, such as the well-known “J.Crew” intellectual property transfer provision, appear far lessfrequentlyin private credit documentation. Our data shows this provision present in only about 2% of private credit software loans versusroughly 23%in the syndicated market.

These differences are not academic. They translate directly into lender leverage during stress scenarios, recovery outcomes, andultimately investorreturns.

The Real Story: Dispersion Is Growing

Averages only tell part of the story, however.

As capital flows into private credit accelerated in recent years, competitive pressures increased. Sponsors are negotiatedfor greaterflexibility,new lenders are entering the market, and documentation quality is showing greater dispersion between the strongest and weakest deals.

In other words, private credit may still be more protective on average — but not uniformly so.

This dispersion islikely amore important structural development than any individual headline around liquidity or loan pricing. For allocators and lenders, understanding which dealsmaintain strong protections — and which do not — is becoming a critical differentiator.

Perception vs. Reality in the Current Market Cycle

Historically,documentation strength—along with collateral coverage—hasexerted a major influence on lender outcomes in distressed and bankruptcy situations.

That is why covenant analysisremainscentral to evaluating risk in both private and syndicated credit markets.

Why Data Matters More Now

As the asset class scales, anecdotal comparisons and manager marketing claims are no longer sufficient.

Independent covenant intelligence — including tools such as Covenant Review and the broader׶Ƶanalytical platform —enablesinvestors to move toward data-driven risk assessment.

By systematically comparing documentation across deals, sectors, and time periods, market participants can:

  • Benchmark underwriting discipline
  • Identify emerging documentation trends
  • Evaluate downside protections before stress occurs
  • Distinguish structural strength from marketing narratives

In an environment where capital is abundant but protections are uneven, information asymmetry creates both opportunity and risk.

That is where rigorouscovenant protections— and the insight provided by׶Ƶcan provide lenders an edge in girding their portfolios against volatile times and potential increase in default rates.

To gain deeper visibility into documentation strength and deal dispersion, request a trial of ׶Ƶ and explore the full platform.

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Private Credit Connect: East /events-type/private-credit-connect-east/ Thu, 04 Sep 2025 21:46:01 +0000 /?post_type=events-type&p=28972 The post Private Credit Connect: East appeared first on ׶Ƶ.

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EMEA Insights: ‘Freebie baskets’ gain foothold in private credit contracts as sponsors seek further debt flexibility /insights-freebie-baskets-gain-foothold-in-private-credit-contracts-as-sponsors-seek-further-debt-flexibility/ Fri, 23 Aug 2024 14:15:53 +0000 /?p=21878 Europe’s private equity sponsors want private credit lenders to give them greater flexibility to increase leverage once an M&A deal has closed and are asking for provisions that typically appear...

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Europe’s private equity sponsors want private credit lenders to give them greater flexibility to increase leverage once an M&A deal has closed and are asking for provisions that typically appear in high-yield deals to be included in their legal contracts.

Specifically, tough negotiations over the implementation of the so-called “freebie basket” in new core and upper mid-market private credit deals are rife, say market sources, and a number of lenders have already agreed to the new terms.

“In some instances, on very good credits with strong sponsors, we are seeing unitranche and private debt deals done with high-yield style covenant packages,” said Megan Lawrence, leveraged finance partner at Proskauer.

In the large-cap private credit space, she says legal document terms, in some instances, are converging with the syndicated loan markets.

Providing headroom for additional debt under a Credit Facilities basket has long been a staple in the high-yield market and has become a cornerstone of additional debt flexibility for borrowers needing an extra turn of leverage. Its prevalence (under the “freebie basket” moniker) has also been on the increase in mid-cap leveraged loan documents.

Now, sponsors are pushing for these more flexible terms in private credit deals thanks to the fierce competition for new business between the broadly syndicated loan and direct lending markets.

Alexander Griffith, private credit partner at Proskauer, confirms that there have been an increasing number of deals over the past 18 months that have added freebie flexibility to certain provisions.

“In most mid-market deals leverage is moderate,” said Henri Lusa, managing director private debt Europe at Partners Group. “However, there are many occasions in which borrowers request the ability to increase leverage post-closing of the deal.”

Ready to roll

The amount of additional leverage requested by sponsors varies from deal to deal, say market sources, though sponsors are typically seeking flexibility through the freebie basket to add 0.5-1x of leverage.

Activating the freebie basket will be dependent on positive EBITDA performance of the company in question.

Having this flexibility in the documents can cut out further rounds of negotiations between parties if new capital is needed for an acquisition, because the documents are already in place, says Partners Group’s Lusa.

And, assuming an uptick in M&A activity in the coming months, the capacity to add new debt means both lenders and sponsors are ready to move quickly, when the time comes.

Negotiating flexibility

But despite the increasing number of requests, freebie baskets are currently restricted to the strongest, best-known credits in the private credit space, backed by the biggest sponsors, say market sources. And for the most part, the majority of direct lenders are reticent to offer the provision to would-be-borrowers.

Those that are willing to include the provision may suggest a compromise.

“We are very focused on the ability of borrowers to incur additional debt,”said Mark Bickerstaffe, co-head of direct lending at Hayfin, adding that “we sometimes see sponsors preferring a lower opening leverage with the ability to increase post-closing, for example to fund an acquisition. Subject to the right controls, we are open to providing that flexibility in the docs.”

The maths must work too. Despite the highly competitive financing environment, neither banks nor debt funds can accept the prospect of higher debt in documents if the opening leverage has already reached a critical level at closing of the deal, say market sources.

For now, activity is restricted to all but the private credit market behemoths, but the door is ajar for smaller borrowers who may want to get in on the freebie action in the months ahead.

Sponsors will remember which private credit fund managers have accepted the freebie basket provisions on larger deals, says Griffith, and they’ll ask that same lender to accept the provisions on a smaller deal, too.

Be careful what you wish for

Lenders must be confident that borrowers can handle the load and trust the sponsor to jump in to help in times of stress. High leverage can quickly turn into curse, even for promising borrowers.

In one recent example, Arcmont isGerman computer gaming equipment providerPro Gamers Group(Caseking), according to public filings, in part because of the high leverage multiples.

There was fierce competition to fund this HAL Investments portfolio company in 2021 when the sponsor acquired it from Rivean, given that it benefited from a strong demand for gaming equipment from consumers during the pandemic.

But despite reporting improved revenues and operating income in 2023, it missed HAL’s targets, and the sponsor reduced its expectation of the future profitability of the company.

“In view of the high leverage of the company and the associated interest expense, the book value of the investment in Pro Gamers was fully impaired during 2023 (effect for HAL of €131mn),” the 2023 financial report for HAL stated.

 

Kerstin Kubanek

+44 (0)7442 014 521

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Interval funds emerge alongside non-traded BDCs as compelling option for retail investors /interval-funds-emerge-alongside-non-traded-bdcs/ Tue, 18 Jun 2024 18:12:57 +0000 /?p=21494 Having won over institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments, private credit managers have now set their sights on individual investors, a constituency they are increasingly accessing through interval...

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Having won over institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments, private credit managers have now set their sights on individual investors, a constituency they are increasingly accessing through interval funds.

With more investors wanting access to the double-digit yields private credit can offer, fundraising in the retail channel has ramped up. While the proliferation of non-traded BDCs has promoted access to retail investors, interval funds are beginning to hold their own as they become an increasingly popular tool for this group to get in on the action.

There have been several such funds launched in recent weeks. Principal Global Investors began offering a private credit interval fund that lends to companies with $5mn to $50mn of EBITDA. StepStone Private Wealth launched similar fund that will target senior secured private credit investments using a “multi-lender approach.”

“The interval fund structure offers greater liquidity, accessibility to retail investors, daily share prices, and a perpetual life structure, making it a more shareholder-friendly vehicle for most investors,” said Shiloh Bates, CIO at Flat Rock Global.

In 2020, Flat Rock converted its private BDC into an interval fund, noting investors in these funds don’t need to be an accredited investor or sign onerous subscription paperwork to invest, thus making it easier to access. Lack of volatility in interval funds and a wider investor reach also factored into Flat Rock’s decision to convert, according to Bates.

The rise of interval funds

Unlike most closed-end funds that sell shares and then trade on an exchange, interval funds enable investors to redeem or add shares at certain times. Also, they are not publicly traded entities; the daily share prices are what investors buy in at and then can cash out during the next redemption period.

These types of funds are particularly attractive to investors because of their return potential and mandatory periodic liquidity offered through quarterly repurchases of between 5% and 25% of shares at net asset value.

In addition to the lack of the subscription document, you may begin investing right away and earning a dividend immediately, unlike a private-equity-style structure in which it may take months for LPs to be fully invested.

“We made [StepStone Private Credit Income Fund] available to all investors, not just high-net-worth investors, on a ‘buy with a click’ basis, eliminating the friction of subscription agreements,” said Bob Long, CEO of StepStone Private Wealth, the private wealth arm of StepStone Group.

The appeal of interval funds is evident in the numbers. Currently there are 93 active interval funds, representing $89bn in assets under management, according to Intervalfunds.org. There are 43 interval funds pending registration with the SEC.

While still a relatively small market compared with other fund types, interval funds have seen rapid growth in the last decade; assets under management in 2014 were only about $6.5bn.

This is particularly true for credit strategies.

Interval Fund Tracker, another interval fund database, shows more than 50 interval funds manage more than $30bn in credit assets. For its part, real estate fund managers oversee 11 funds with more than $10bn, while there are only five private equity interval funds.

“There’ve been a lot more interval funds raised recently on a relative basis,” according to Jonathan Gaines, a partner at Dechert.

Whether it’s because we’re in the “golden age” of private credit or the “democratization” of the asset class, as many have touted, LPs are showing no signs of reducing allocations to the space and retail investors are increasingly in the mix too.

In fact, LPs polled by Coller Capital in the summer edition of its biannual Global Private Credit Barometer expect to expand their private credit allocation. Some 70% of LPs said direct lending offered the best opportunities among credit strategies in the next two years, beating out all other debt-investing options.

Not the only fund in town

In addition to interval funds, non-traded BDCs have emerged as another popular way to access the retail channel, and both can earn similar returns, but the case for interval funds can be made by looking at the end investor’s need and appetite for risk.

Structure should flow from investment strategy, says StepStone Private Wealth’s Long. “We believe that a direct-lending focused strategy complemented by a modest allocation to specialty credit provides a distinctive risk/reward profile for individual investors,” Long said.

Non-traded BDCs may offer redemptions once per quarter but are not required. A decision to halt these redemptions cuts off a liquidity path for the fund’s investors.

“The 5% per quarter redemptions in an interval fund are mandatory, while BDC boards typically retain discretion, and thus investors can have more confidence in the liquidity offered in an interval fund,” says Long.

Another attraction of investing in these BDCs would be the leverage, sources say. BDCs can also utilize 2:1 leverage on a debt-to-equity basis, while interval funds limited to 0.5:1 without using preferred stock, according to Gaines.

­“If you don’t need the higher leverage limit or flexibility, it may make sense to consider raising an interval fund since it’s typically quicker to launch than a non-traded BDC and may be more suitable for certain distribution channels [such as RIAs],” Gaines said.

StepStone’s Long though said they can meet investor expectations without that extra leverage.

“While BDCs do have the flexibility to take on twice as much leverage as an interval fund, we don’t believe that extra leverage is necessary for the [StepStone interval fund] investment strategy to deliver our targeted returns,” he said.

Still, there’s no denying the attractive yields these funds BDCs offer, and they will remain a steady source of access to private credit investments. But it doesn’t need to be an either-or calculation.

“There is absolutely a place for bothBDCs and interval funds as part of a private credit strategy,” said Gaines.

 

Krista Giovacco
krista.giovacco@levfininsights.com|
LevFin Insights

 


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